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Abstract
We consider corporate tax evasion as a decision a¤ecting business partners.
There are costs of uncoordinated tax reports, both in terms of catching in-
spectorsattention and running accounts. If these costs are small, there exist
a unique Nash equilibrium of the game between the tax authority and a pop-
ulation of heterogenous rms. In this equilibrium, the miscoordination costs
enhance non-compliance if and only if more than 50% of the rms are cheat-
ing. This provides one rationale for developing countries to be cautious with
employing rened auditing schemes and for developed countries to promote
complicated accounting procedures.
JEL Classication: H26, H32
Keywords: tax evasion, coordination, business partners
1 Introduction
Recent years have seen a surge in research on tax evasion of rms. The interest
was aroused by an observation that rm adds new dimensions to the problem over
and above standard gambling and cat-and-mouse1 approaches. First, a rm is not a
single decision maker and has its own agency problem, as stressed by Crocker and
Slemrod (2005). Second, the interaction between rms can be important for the
I am grateful to Karl Schlag and participants of workshops at EUI and Tinbergen Institute for
discussion.
1The term is borrowed from Cowell (2006) and refers to the modeling of evasion as a game
between tax agency and a single taxpayer.
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general outcome, as Bayer and Cowell (2005) and Sanchez (2006) point out, although
Lipatov (2003) shows that the interaction matters in games with individual taxpayers
as well.
We look here at a long run situation in an economy where rms exercise trans-
actions with each other. Each rm submits a tax report that can be then audited
by the tax authority. The rms di¤er in their decision to evade taxes and if so, how
aggressively. This is a long run decision, as it requires adoption of special accounting
policy that either permits evasion or not. By evasion we certainly mean sophisticated
evasion, that is tax evasion that requires certain expertise and involves intricate ma-
nipulation of accounts, as opposed to blunt underreporting. This term is also used
in the same sense by Lipatov (2005). The evasion decision of the rms is an out-
come of rational prot maximization given their expectations about the decision of
transacting partners and audit intensity.
Thus, in our economy the rms face two types of costs in addition to standard
costs and benets of evasion. We call them coordination costs. The rst type is
exogenous costs, which arise every time there is a transaction between rms with
di¤erent decisions about evasion. These are related to the adjustment of accounts for
di¤erent kinds of rms: e. g., an evading rm that meets an honestrm has to
create an additional ctitious rm in order to evade without creating inconsistency
in the accounts, whereas two evading rms can manage the transaction consistent
without additional e¤orts. The second type is endogenous costs, which arise every
time the tax authority sets unequal probability of auditing for the cases of observing
similar and di¤erent reports of the two transacting rms.
The endogenous costs are also present in Sanchez (2006). The di¤erence of his
paper from our approach is not only in lack of exogenous costs, but also that he
considers tax authority with ability to commit. This is well explained by di¤erent
ideas underlying the two papers: whereas we consider long-run equilibrium, Sanchez
concentrates on the short-term with the aim of constructing auditing rule that mini-
mizes mistakes of the tax authority (in sense of auditing the honest and not auditing
cheaters). Furthermore, whereas Sanchez describes the situation in a homogenous
auditing class, assuming perfect correlation of income and uncertainty about the au-
diting rule, we consider a pair of rms with imperfectly correlated income.
The paper by Bayer and Cowell (2005) stands even further from us, as it looks at
the e¤ect of auditing on joint decision of competing rms to evade and to produce.
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We consider rms that are partners rather than competitors. Crocker and Slemrod
(2005) go inside a rm, whereas we treat it as a decision making unit.
In general, we believe that no commitment approach is more appropriate for the
models with two levels of income. Firstly, the tradition in the literature is that
commitment models are only considered with a continuum of income levels. Secondly,
though the auditing rules are often announced, there is no means to establish whether
they are actually followed. Thus, ability to commit may be a too strong assumption
to make.
The tax authority in our model observes the transacting pairs. This seems a
reasonable assumption at least for Russia, where the auditing of one rm involves
checking accounts of the rms that are transacting with it, as described e. g. in
Sumina (2006). In reality there are many rms transacting with each other, and
taking pairs is just a necessary simplication. Considering more than two rms in a
match and overlapping matches would make the analysis unmanageable analytically,
while not adding much to our main point.
The main result of the paper is the fact that the equilibrium cheating and auditing
di¤er substantially from the approach disregarding transactions among the rms,
even if the costs of miscoordination are small. When evasion is not popular (less
than a half of the rms evade), the share of cheating rms as well as the auditing
probability are likely to be overestimated, if the coordination of tax reports is not
taken into account. In case of popular misreporting, both the share of non-compliers
and the auditing probability are underestimated. It is worth noting that the auditing
probability in our setting varies with the reports combination, making comparison
with uniform auditing probability of the representative case di¢ cult in principle.
Furthermore, we nd that the miscoordination costs decrease cheating and au-
diting when less than 50% of all rms are underreporting and increase them in case
evasion is popular. The correlation of prots has a similar e¤ect. In both instances,
with coordination cost ascent the more popular strategy becomes more attractive,
hence more rms choose it in equilibrium.
The auditing probability in our model can be positively a¤ected by the amount
of nes, unlike in representative case. This becomes possible because the direct e¤ect
of larger nes to make auditing more attractive overplays the indirect e¤ect coming
through the reduced cheating. Coordination costs amplify the indirect e¤ect, making
nes more or less e¤ective depending on whether cheating or honesty prevails. We
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also show that the auditing is negatively a¤ected by its own costs. All three types of
costs, exogenous miscoordination, prots correlation embodied in di¤erent auditing
probabilities, and auditing costs are reinforcing each other.
We also shed some light on the mechanism of evasion game when coordination
matters: we show that correlation of prots solely generates the di¤erence in auditing
probabilities. The exogenous miscoordination costs alone change equilibrium cheating
and auditing, but leave the latter independent from the report conguration.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. The model setup is presented in
the next section, followed by the description of equilibrium structure. Section four is
devoted to the discussion of the results for mixed equilibrium. Section ve looks at a
calibrated example. Conclusion is followed by appendix with derivations of equilibria
and results.
2 Evasion game
2.1 Single rm benchmark
Let us start with the case when there are no transacting pairs and no miscoordination
costs. A single rm decides whether to evade its prot, facing the tax authority that
can perform auditing. We use the approach of Graez, Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
in this benchmark, with a convex rather than linear cost function for auditing.
First, the nature moves, assigning a type to the rms: high prot h =  or low
prot l = 0. The types are drawn from a distribution characterized by a density
function
f (x) =
(
 if x = 
1   if x = 0 :
Second, the high prot rms decide whether to submit a high report H =  (be
honest) or a low report L = 0 (cheat).
The tax authority does not audit high reports and exerts e¤ort a in auditing low
reports. We take a function a (p) =  k ln(1  p) from Reinganum and Wilde (1986)
as the mapping from detection probability dened on the unit interval to the au-
diting e¤ort dened for non-negative real numbers. The inverse function determines
detection probability from the e¤ort p (a) = 1   e  ak . k is a detection di¢ culty pa-
rameter: the higher it is, the more e¤ort is required to support a given detection
probability. The rms can never be detected with certainty, and zero e¤ort results in
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zero detection probability. The low report is honest with probability 1 
1 +q and not
with the complementary probability, where q is the probability that high prot rm
is cheating.
The authority is maximizing its expected revenue q
1 +qp (a) (1 + s) t   a, the
high income rm - its expected prot    p (a) (1 + s) t. Here s is a surcharge rate
for being caught, t is a tax rate.
When st > k

, there exists a unique equilibrium characterized by the auditing
e¤ort a and the evasion probability q:
a =  k ln k (1   + q
)
q (1 + s) t
; (1)
q =
k
st   k
1  

: (2)
This is a conventional result: the evasion share is increasing in auditing costs and
decreasing in the share of high income taxpayers and the ne bill.
When st  k

, a unique equilibrium is characterized by qfc = 1 and afc =
 k ln k
(1+s)t
.
Thus, the equilibrium is always unique. It is a mixed equilibrium, when the ne is
large relative to the auditing costs per high income taxpayer. If, to the opposite, the
ne bill is smaller than the auditing cost, the rm plays pure strategy of cheating in
equilibrium. In our benchmark rms never submit high report with probability one.
The mixed equilibrium is of most interest to us, since the nes are usually high enough
to cover auditing costs in reality. Moreover, this mixed equilibrium is evolutionary
stable (Weibull 1995), as even if a small part of taxpayers gives honest reports, the
reduction in detection probability is not enough to o¤-set a loss from lower evasion.
2.2 Two transacting rms
For further analysis it is useful to introduce the following terminology:
Denition 1 We call an equilibrium of our game full cheating, if all the rms are
submitting low (zero) reports in this equilibrium q = 1; we call an equilibrium full
honesty, if all the high income rms submit high reports q = 0.
2.2.1 General setup
Consider a simultaneous game between two risk neutral rms (call them, for example,
a buyer and a seller) and a tax authority.
5
The rst move is made by the nature that assigns a type to each of the two rms:
high prot h =  or low prot l = 0. We assume now that the prots are correlated
with the correlation coe¢ cient r; 0  r < 12. We do not consider negative correlation,
as our rms are cooperating rather than competing. The joint distribution of two
types in a match is given by the following density function:
f (x; y) =
8>><>>:
; if x = y = ;
   ; if fx; yg = f0; g ;
1  2 + ; if x = y = 0:
where  := 2 +  (1  ) r.
The second move is made by the high prot rms. They decide whether to submit
a high report H =  (be honest) or a low report L = 0 (cheat). A high income rm
incurs exogenous coordination costs c if the other rm is of the same type but submits
a di¤erent tax report. Each rm of type h (high prot) gets expected payo¤of u (i; j),
where i is its own report and j is a report of its partner:
u (L;L) =    p (LL) (1 + s) t;
u (L;H) =    p (HL) (1 + s) t   c;
u (H;H) =  (1  t) ;
u (H;L) =  (1  t)  c:
The rm of type l gets zero payo¤.
The third move is by the tax authority, which chooses an auditing e¤ort a 2 R+
conditional on the reports observed: a (LL) (two low reports), a (HL) (a low and a
high report in any order), a (HH) (two high reports). The tax authority gets expected
revenue of p (a) (1 + s) t a from each cheater it audits and the revenue t a from
each honest report it audits.
The game takes into account both exogenous costs (c per rm) and endogenous
costs of miscoordination. The exogenous costs have at least two sources: 1) it takes
up resources to create an evasion scheme, so sharing the evasion design costs is one
way to reduce per rm costs; 2) it is easier to run accounts of each rm (they are
more compatible), when both and not only one are evading. If the rst source plays
2We have also analyzed the case when r = 1, but since this is not likely to happen in reality, we
do not present the results here. It turns out that the equilibrium structure in this case is distinctly
di¤erent from correlation arbitrary close to perfect, so we also can not use it as a benchmark. The
derivation of equilibrium is available apon request.
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an important role, the exogenous coordination costs are greater for the rm which is
evading, as the honest one does not have to develop an evasion scheme. For the sake
of simplicity though we let the two equal in the present analysis, as it does not alter
the main message of the paper, coordination aspect of rmsevasion. One can think
that the evasion schemes are easily available in the economy, so that the rst factor
becomes unimportant.
The endogenous coordination cost is self-explanatory: it reects the di¤erence
in detection probabilities the tax authority might want to generate. Namely, it can
exert di¤erent e¤orts in auditing low prot report depending on whether it comes
with another low report or with a high report. Compared to the case of two low
reports, it needs a half of resources to provide the same auditing probability if one of
the reports is high. Thus, we do not consider that coordinated evasion might require
more e¤ort to discover than uncoordinated.
We choose the simultaneous formulation rather than a sequential one, because
we do not want to consider a particular industry structure or a relation between
an entrant and an incumbent. Our goal is to characterize the economy where two
rms from di¤erent populations (again, think of buyers and sellers) meet to play a
coordination game. Even more, since the decisions are long-term, they become a
property of the rms, so that they can be characterized as evaders or honest. In this
way, the Nash equilibria of the simultaneous game show us where these populations
could converge, if, for example, less protable rms were dying out.
2.2.2 Optimization problem of the tax authority
The tax authority observes the match. Recall that we denote with lower-case letters
the prots, and with upper-case the reports. We have then the following prot -
report table
total HH HL LL
hh   (1  q)2 2q (1  q) q2
hl 2 (   ) 0 2 (   ) (1  q) 2q (   )
ll 1  2 +  0 0 1  2 + 
which represents the measures (or shares) of taxpayer pairs reporting incomes given
by the column entries, while actually receiving incomes given by row entries.
The following lemma characterizes the best response of the tax authority in this
case.
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Lemma 2 In the tax evasion game above the best response of the tax authority to the
rms cheating with probability q 2 (0; 1] is the following strategy:
a (HH) = 0; (3)
a (HL; q) =  k ln

k
q +    
q (1 + s) t

; (4)
a (LL; q) =  k ln

k
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t

: (5)
The proof is left to the appendix A. Obviously, observing two high reports the tax
authority does not audit them. Observing di¤erent reports in a match, the authority
audits the low one with probability determined by the e¤ort a (HL). When two low
reports are observed, the optimal auditing e¤ort is given by a (HL).
Note that the two e¤orts (and corresponding probabilities) are only equal, when
r = 0, that is the report of one rm does not contain any information about the prot
of the other rm. With r > 0 we have a (HL) > a (LL), which is quite intuitive:
di¤erent reports indicate possible cheating, so it makes sense to audit them more.
2.2.3 Equilibria
The proposition 3 characterizes the equilibria arising in case of perfectly correlated
draws. We denote the equilibrium values of cheating probability with q and of
auditing e¤ort with a.
Proposition 3 In the tax evasion game with two transacting rms
(i) If c < min fst   k; tg, there exists a unique symmetric equilibrium, and
q =
st + c  k  
q
(st + c  k)2   8ck (1  )
4c
; (6)
a (HH) = 0, a (HL) = a (HL; q), a (LL) = a (LL; q) as given by (3).
(ii) If st   k  c < t, there exists a unique full cheating equilibrium, and
q = 1, a (HH) = 0, a (HL) = a (HL; 1), a (LL) = a (LL; 1).
(iii) If t  c < st   k, there is a unique equilibrium of full honesty, and
q = 0; a  0.
(iv) If c > max fst   k; tg, there are three equilibria: full honesty described
in (iii), full cheating described in (ii), and a mixed equilibrium described in (i).
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The proof of the proposition is left to appendix B. The structure of equilibria
is very intuitive: for small coordination costs (relative to both payo¤ from auditing
cheaters st   k and the tax bill t) there is a unique mixed equilibrium, as in
a standard game without coordination issues. With larger costs of miscoordination,
pure cheating or pure honesty dominates depending on how large are auditing costs
relative to auditing benets (nes and share of high income rms). Finally, when
the miscoordination costs are very large, any coordinated pure strategy prole is an
equilibrium, plus there is an unstable mixture between them.
3 Discussion of the results
3.1 Summary
Since we believe that the exogenous coordination costs are relatively small, we can
concentrate on the regions of parameter values where a mixed equilibrium exists.
Then for further consideration our results can be conveniently summarized in the
following table:
representative correlated
q k
st k
1 

st+c k 
p
(st+c k)2 8ck(1 )
4c
p (LL) 1
1+s
1  k q2+2q( )+1 2+
(q2+q( ))(1+s)t
p (HL) n/a 1  k q+ 
q(1+s)t
Here we used (1) to derive the auditing probability in representative case. The other
expressions are taken straightforwardly from the text. As it has been already noted,
the probability of auditing for dissonant reports is higher than that for the same re-
ports as long as r > 0. A further breakdown of the miscoordination costs propagation
mechanism is represented in the table below:
c = 0; r = 0 c > 0; r = 0 c = 0; r > 0
q k
st k
1 

st+c k 
p
(st+c k)2 8ck(1 )
4c
k
st k
1 

p (LL) 1
1+s
1  k(1 +q)
q(1+s)t 1  k 1 2(1 q
)+(1 q)2
((q 1)+)q(1+s)t
p (HL) 1
1+s
1  k(1 +q)
q(1+s)t
1
1+s
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From this table we see clearly that the endogenous miscoordination costs are only
embodied in the di¤erential auditing probability, and some correlation in the prots
is enough to generate them even in the absence of exogenous costs. On the other
hand, only exogenous costs shift equilibrium cheating probability even in the absence
of auditing intensity di¤erential. Thus, the two channels of the miscoordination costs
can be clearly separated. This does not mean they do not interact at all; in fact,
comparative statics shows that they reinforce each other.
3.1.1 Payo¤s
With each case there are associated payo¤s: a pair of tax revenues R and after-tax
(expected) income of high income rm I. We summarize them in another table
representative correlated
R t   (1   + q) a Rc
I (1  t) (1  t)   

qc
where
Rc=2 =  (1  q) t + q (1 + s) t   k (q + 1  ) 
(q +    ) (1  q) a (HL)  a (LL)  q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 +  :
The derivation of each term is left to the appendix C.
We see that with more correlation the expected punishment for miscoordination
is more severe. This is due to the absence of coordination costs in case of matching
with a low prot rm. The revenue of the tax authority is inuenced through many
di¤erent channels, e.g evasion share and two auditing probabilities, so it is impossible
to say something unambiguous at this level of generality.
3.2 Comparative statics
Our next step is to derive comparative statics results in the same vein. First, we are
interested how e¤ective the nes are in deterring rms from cheating, second, how
the equilibrium values depend on the coordination costs. The derivation is left to the
appendix D.
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representative matched
dq
dc
; dq

dr
n/a >< 0
dq
dk
> 0 > 0
dq
ds
  kt
(st k)2
1 

< 0 < 0
dp
ds
  1
(1+s)2
< 0 < 0
We can see that miscoordination costs a¤ect equilibrium compliance in an in-
teresting way. If the share of compliant taxpayers is above one half, the costs are
decreasing evasion; in the opposite case they are increasing it. This is true for both
exogenous and endogenous costs. The second order e¤ect is also crucially a¤ected
by popularity of cheating: the cheating is convex in costs for intervals
 
0; 1
4

and 
1
2
; 1

of the range; it is concave on the rest of the unit interval. In other words, if
the cheating is popular, it becomes increasingly so with higher miscoordination costs.
The auditing costs make the cheating easier in any case.
The intuition here is straightforward: when cheating is more popular, a rm can
economize on the miscoordination costs by "imitating" behavior of the majority. The
auditing costs do not depend on the companion-cheaters, so their e¤ect on com-
pliance is constant negative. The convexity results are not so straightforward, and
reect the nonlinearity of prot maximizing relation between miscoordination costs
and compliance.
We also look at the interaction of all three types of costs. The general tendency
here is reinforcing each other, that is the cheating stimulating e¤ect of, for instance,
miscoordination costs is the greater the larger are auditing costs. We shall get the
following kind of matrix for our interactions,
c  k
c +
 + +
k + + +
where plusmeans reinforcing e¤ect.
The other block of comparative statics results is related to ne. The cheating
is of course decreasing in ne. We dene the measure of e¤ectiveness of the ne
as the absolute value of the derivative of the equilibrium cheating
dq
ds
. We are
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interested how this measure is a¤ected by costs. Unexpectedly, the ne e¤ectiveness
is increasing with miscoordination costs when cheating is popular, and decreasing
in the opposite case. This fact becomes more intuitive when we see that the ne
e¤ectiveness is increasing in cheating itself. Thus, the costs a¤ect ne e¤ectiveness
through the amount of cheating.
Immediate policy advice follows. If we observe a change in the level of miscoor-
dination costs (for example, as a result of Sorbane-Oxley act they rise dramatically)
given popularity of cheating, a change in ne e¤ectiveness can be predicted, and hence
we can say whether the nes should be corrected. Another little matrix illustrates
this logic:
q ' 1 q ' 0
c " +  
c #   +
The last e¤ect we consider here is the one of the share of high income taxpayers.
Though more subtle and complicated for an arbitrary value of cheating, this e¤ect is
the same as the cost e¤ect at extremes: when the cheating is very popular, more high
income taxpayers increase the share of cheating; when it is very rare, the opposite
is true. The mechanism works also through coordination: with a larger share of
high income taxpayers there are more miscoordination costs to economize on, that is
imitatethe majority.
3.3 Example
In this example we calibrate our parameters to the values common in the literature.
We want to see how at plausible parameter values the coordination costs a¤ect equi-
librium cheating and auditing quantitatively. To do this, we shall rstly explain the
choice of parameters. Secondly, we dene two benchmarks according to how wide-
spread evasion is: popular cheating featuring developing countries and rare cheating
characterizing developed world. Finally, we look at how the cheating and auditing
probabilities as well as tax revenue are changing for each of the benchmarks.
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3.3.1 Cheating probability
Since the literature before us did not consider miscoordination costs explicitly, we
leave them free. We take the values of most parameters directly from Lipatov (2005),
as we follows the same logic there: s = 0:8; t = 0:3;  = 0:5. Choice of  is arbitrary,
as it is not unit-free. We normalize the prot to unity to have  = 1. The simplest
calibration for the case of no miscoordination costs gives
k =
1
1 
q0
+ 1
st;
which having in mind estimates for shadow sector of 60% q0 = 0:6 in some countries
gives k = 0:045. Fixing these parameters, we get the following picture:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
cost
q
Figure 1. The share of cheating rms q depending on miscoordination costs c, high
evasion regime
On the horizontal axis we can see here jointmiscoordination costs, that is a product
of exogenous costs c and prot correlation r. The vertical axis show the share of
cheating rms. Note that for given value of high income share,  takes values between
0:25 and 0:5, so that most of variation observed on the picture is due to the exogenous
costs.
The chart illustrates all types of equilibria considered before: with low miscoordi-
nation costs there is a mixture, in which the costs are increasing cheating; with higher
costs there is full evasion equilibrium, and at very high costs three equilibria exist.
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We can see that if the auditing costs are low enough so that without miscoordination
the cheating is less than a half (we take 20% q0 = 0:2), we get a di¤erent picture:
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
cost
q
Figure 2. The share of cheaters q depending on miscoordination costs c, low evasion
regime
Thus, in our calibrated example with low auditing costs the mixed equilibrium is
very robust to the miscoordination costs changes. We should note, however, that the
values of cheating share for high miscoordination costs are not precise, as the lower
auditing probability hits nonnegativity constraint (below the range is shown more
precisely). As predicted, the costs decrease cheating when it is not popular.
3.3.2 Auditing probability - high low reports combination
The auditing probability for the both cases is plotted on the following pictures:
0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
0.60
0.62
0.64
0.66
0.68
0.70
0.72
r
p
Figure 3. H igh low rep orts auditing probability p(HL) dep ending on correlation r, h igh evasion regim e, c = 0:1
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This is the higher probability (to audit a miscoordinated report) for a situation when
cheating is popular. We plot the correlation coe¢ cient on the horizontal axis, taking
exogenous correlation cost at c = 0:1 (the value that assures existence of our equilib-
rium for small correlation). The probability is increasing in the costs together with
the share of cheaters. The indirect (through the evasion share) e¤ect of correlation
in the reports works in the same direction as the direct e¤ect3. The indirect e¤ect
is conventionally explained by strategic interaction, the direct one makes sense, be-
cause with more correlation there is a higher chance for uncoordinated report to be
cheating.
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
r
p
Figure 4. High low reports auditing probability p (HL) depending on correlation r, low
evasion regime, c = 0:03
This is the initial low cheating situation. The auditing probability is lower than in
previous case and increasing. The values for correlation coe¢ cient exceeding 50% are
not precise, as the nonnegativity constraint of the auditing probability for coordinated
reports is binding. The direct and indirect e¤ects of the reports correlation act in
opposite directions, and it turns out that the direct e¤ect prevails.
3We can see clearly that the direct e¤ect is positive, if we rewrite the auditing probability as
1  k q+

 1
q(1+s)t
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3.3.3 Auditing probability - two low reports
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p
Figure 5. Tow low reports auditing probability p (HL) depending on correlation r, high
evasion regime, c = 0:1
Here is the auditing of coordinated reports when the cheating is popular. It is not
monotonous in the correlation coe¢ cient, but is increasing on the most of the domain.
Again the indirect e¤ect is of course to enhance auditing, and the direct one to lower
it4. Depending on which e¤ect overtakes, we observe increasing or decreasing auditing
probability.
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Figure 6. Tow low reports auditing probability p (HL) depending on correlation r, low
evasion regime, c = 0:1
When the cheating is not popular, the probability to audit coordinated report is
decreasing up to zero. Both direct and indirect e¤ects work in the same direction,
4It can be shown that the derivative of the probability to audit coordinated reports wrt misco-
ordination costs has the same sign as  q (1  q) (1 + q).
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inhibiting the auditing.
The stylized examples above nicely illustrate di¤erent policies towards miscoordi-
nation costs appropriate for di¤erent countries. The low auditing costs situation is
more likely in developed countries with low level of evasion. In such cases the e¤orts
to decrease miscoordination costs can be dangerous in a sense of bringing about more
cheating. Moreover, this is coupled with more auditing, which is wasteful, as it does
not reduce cheating. The high auditing costs picture is for the countries with our-
ishing evasion, like most of developing countries and CIS countries. These countries
should not pay too much attention to correlation of prots, as increasing the costs of
coordination may result in even larger cheating.
From this prospective, the Sorbanes-Oxley act can be justied as increasing costs
c in the US. Unwillingness of many developing countries to be involved in a detailed
analysis of industry structures in order to deduce true tax income can also be ratio-
nalized with the help of our model. This is certainly not to say that there are no
more important factors underlying both phenomena, but simply to show that our
model seems to go well with some stylized facts we know.
Tax revenue
Finally, we can see how the tax revenue is changing with correlation coe¢ cient.
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10 0.12 0.14 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.24 0.26
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0.044
0.046
0.048
0.050
0.052
0.054
r
R
Figure 7. Tax revenue R depending on correlation r, high evasion regime, c = 0:1
Again, we have correlation coe¢ cient on the horizontal axis. The revenue is increasing
for both high evasion (above) and low evasion (below) regimes. This is not as intuitive
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as the decreasing after-tax income, because the auditors do not su¤er miscoordination
costs directly. The result is due to the interaction of various forces, but we see that
the authority is able to use higher correlation of reports to enhance its revenue.
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y
Figure 8. Tax revenue R depending on correlation r, low evasion regime, c = 0:1
4 Conclusion
The tax evasion game with costs of not coordinating decision between contracting
rms is considered in this paper. We show that when miscoordination costs are small,
there is a unique mixed strategy equilibrium with a positive share of evading rms and
a positive share of audited reports. When the costs are substantial, there is a unique
pure strategy equilibrium with either everybody or nobody evading, depending on the
auditing e¤ectiveness of the tax authority. If the miscoordination costs are very big,
both full honesty and full cheating are equilibria, with an unstable mixture between
them.
The game yields the insights that are impossible to obtain within the represen-
tative rm framework. Firstly, the tax authority should put more e¤ort in auditing
rms that did not coordinate their evasion decision, if it maximizes its expected rev-
enue. Secondly, the coordination costs a¤ect the amount of evasion in the opposite
directions depending on what is the equilibrium share of cheating. If there are more
then half non-compliant high income taxpayers, the coordination costs increase eva-
sion, and visa versa. The correlation of taxpayer income acts in the same way as
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miscoordination costs. Finally, the situation when everybody honest is more likely to
result the stronger are the links between taxpayers, that is the higher is correlation
between their prots.
Another set of results is derived from the e¤ects our parameters have on equilib-
rium cheating. We see that various costs considered here (two types of miscoordi-
nation costs and auditing costs) always reinforce each others e¤ect on equilibrium
cheating. This complementarity calls for cost changing interventions, as reduction
even in one type of costs will have an extended e¤ect through other types. The ne
e¤ectiveness in our setup is inuenced by miscoordination costs as well. It is a¤ected
positively when cheating is popular, and negatively in the opposite case. Finally,
when almost everybody is evading, more high income taxpayers increase the share of
cheating; when almost everybody is honest, the opposite is true.
There is a number of policy recommendations arising from our analysis. Firstly,
miscoordination costs reduction e¤orts are only justied for economies (or industries)
with substantial shadow sector. Such e¤orts include simplied accounting (exogenous
costs) and little interest in the business links (endogenous costs through auditing
probability di¤erential). This, of course, is not applicable when the sole goal of
the government is the tax authoritys revenue, which is increasing in costs for our
parameter values. Secondly, the miscoordination costs manipulation appears to be a
promising way for achieving socially benecial equilibria, as it works as a complement
with other costs. Thirdly, nes become more e¢ cient and therefore should be more
widely used in low cheating - low miscoordination costs and high cheating - high
miscoordination costs.
We hope that our paper opens up a whole tile of issues that could not be addressed
by the literature before. How do the links between taxpayers a¤ect their decision to
pay taxes? How are these links taken into account by the tax authority? Could the
government change the structure of these links for the benet of the whole society?
We can not answer these questions in a far too simplied setting of business pairs we
have here. However, what we can do is to say that the equilibrium behavior of the
agents is a¤ected signicantly by the links between them, that it is a¤ected through
the costs of behaving di¤erently, and it is a¤ected in the direction of harmonization
of this behavior.
19
References
[1] Alm, J. and M. Mckee (2004). Tax compliance as a coordination game. Journal
of Economic Behavior & Organization 54, 297-312.
[2] James Andreoni, Brian Erard and Jonathan Feinstein. Tax Compliance. Journal
of Economic Literature, June 1998, pp. 818-860.
[3] Bayer, R. and Cowell, F. A. (2005) "Tax Compliance and FirmsStrategic In-
terdependence" Distributional Analysis Discussion Paper, 81, STICERD, LSE,
Houghton St., London, WC2A 2AE.
[4] Frank Cowell. The Economics of Tax Evasion, MIT Press, 1990.
[5] K. Crocker and J. Slemrod. Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs. Journal
of Public Economics, vol. 89(9-10), pages 1593-160, September 2005.
[6] Michael Graetz, Jennifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde. The Tax Compliance
Game: Towards an Interactive Theory of Law Enforcement. Journal of Law,
Economics and Organization, 2(1), pp. 1-32, 1986.
[7] V. Lipatov. Evolution of Tax Evasion. Unpublished manuscript, 2003.
[8] V. Lipatov. Corporate Evasion: a Case for Specialists. Unpublished manuscript,
2005.
[9] Jenifer Reinganum and Louis Wilde. Equilibrium Verication and Reporting
Policies in a Model of Tax Compliance. International Economic Review, 27(3),
pp. 739-60, 1986.
[10] Sánchez, M. (2006). Divide and conquer: Tax evasion as a global game. Distrib-
utional Analysis Discussion Paper 80, STICERD, London School of Economics,
London WC2A 2AE.
[11] Schneider F. and Enste D. Shadow Economies: Size, Causes, and Consequences.
Journal of Economic Literature, pp.77-114, 2000
[12] Sumina O. Judges worked out a new model for VAT reimbursement. Moscow
Accountant, February 2006 (in Russian)
[13] Jörgen W. Weibull. Evolutionary Game Theory. MIT Press, 1995.
20
Appendices
A - Proof of Lemma 1
The expected revenue of the auditor is
2 (1  q)2 t + (2q (1  q) + 2 (   ) (1  q)) (7)


t + (1 + s) p (HL)
2q (1  q)
2q (1  q) + 2 (   ) (1  q)t   a^ (HL)

+
 
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 


(1 + s) tp (LL)
2q2 + 2q (   )
2q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 +    2a (LL)

Rearranging and taking rst order conditions with respect to a (LL) and a^ (HL) gives
a^ (HL) :   (2q (1  q) + 2 (   ) (1  q)) + 2q (1  q) (1 + s) p0 (HL) t = 0
a (LL) :
 
2q2 + 2q (   ) (1 + s) tp0 (LL)  2  q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 +  = 0
Working this out, we arrive at
p0 (HL) =
q +    
q (1 + s) t
p0 (LL) =
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t
from which we can compare a (LL) and a^ (HL). If a^ (HL) > a (LL), due to convexity
of e¤ort we have p0 (HL) < p0 (LL), or
q +    

<
q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
q +    
since the inmum of the rhs denominator iz zero, we can muliply by it, to get after
rearrangement
2 < 
which is true for any positive correlation and holds with equality for independent
draws.
To complete the lemma, we use the functional form of the probability
e 
a^
k = kp0 (a)
to obtain the expressions (??) and (3) for the auditing e¤ort.
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B - Proof of proposition 2
Mixed strategies
To show that p; q is indeed a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, we need 1) p is
a best response of tax authority given the belief about q; 2) q is a best response of
each rm to the authority playing p and the other rm playing q; 3) the belief of the
authority is consistent with equilibrium play of the rms.
For 1) we need (??) and (3); for 2) in a mixed equilibrium it is su¢ cient that each
rm is indi¤erent between cheating and honesty given that the other high income
rm is cheating with probability q:
q +    

(   p (LL) (1 + s) t) + 

(1  q) (   p (HL) (1 + s) t   c) =
=


q ( (1  t)  c) +

1  

q

( (1  t))
where we assume that there is no coordination costs of meeting the low income rm.
Once one rm knows it has high prot, the conditional probabilities for the other rm
to be high (low) are 

( 

). Rearranging, we get
((q +    ) p (LL) +  (1  q) p (HL)) (1 + s) t = t    (1  2q) c
Substituting for the best response of the authority and rearranging, we have
2q2c+ q (k   st   c) + k (1  ) = 0
Solving the quadratic equation and picking up the relevant root (the one that stays
in the unit interval for reasonable parameter values), we get (6).
Of course, both auditing probabilities should satisfy probability restrictions. In
our case it is su¢ cient to check that p (HL)  1 and p (LL)  0. The former is
automatically satised, the latter is equivalent to
k (q (   ) + 1  2 + )   q2 + q (   ) ((1 + s) t   k)
which is insured for relatively small auditing costs and is in general more likely to
hold for small correlation coe¢ cients (and hence small ). When this nonnegativity
condition is violated, the robability to cheat is changed according to constraint opti-
mization. The precise formulae can be derived in a similar fashion; we do not do it
here because it is out of our focus.
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Pure strategies
Full cheating condition is
   p (LL; q = 1) (1 + s) t >  (1  t)  

c
After substituting for the best response of authority with consistent belief about full
cheating p (LL; q = 1) = 1  k
(1+s)t
and simplifying, we arrive at
c > st   k (8)
Full honesty condition
   

(   p (LL; q = 0) (1 + s) t) + 

(   p (HL; q = 0) (1 + s) t   c) <  (1  t)
After substituting for the best response of authority with consistent belief about full
honesty p (LL) = p (HL) = 0, we get
t < c
Combining the results for mixed and pure strategies, we get the statement of the
proposition.
C - payo¤s computation
Representative The expected payo¤ of the authority in this case is by denition
R = (1  q) t + (1   + q)

q
1   + q p (1 + s) t   a

This can be rearranged to get
R = (1  q + pq (1 + s)) t   (1   + q) a
or, substituting for equilibrium values of p and q,
R = t

 + (1  ) sk
st   k ln
s
1 + s

Income of the high type is by denition
I = q (   p (1 + s) t) + (1  q) (1  t)
which can be rearranged to
I = (1  t)
Note that the same is obtained by the logic of indi¤erence between cheating and
staying honest.
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Coordinated For the authority the expected revenue (7) can be represented as
R = 2 (1  q)2 t + (2q (1  q) + 2 (   ) (1  q)) (t   a^ (HL)) (9)
+(1 + s) p (HL) 2q (1  q) t   2a (LL)  q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
+(1 + s) tp (LL)
 
2q2 + 2q (   )
which can be re-arranged to
R
2
=  (1  q) t + q (1 + s) t   k (q + 1  )
  (q +    ) (1  q) a^ (HL)  a (LL)  q2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
which is not incredibly intuitive, but outlines two sources of income and two sources
of costs. The income consists of voluntarycontributions by the honest and nes
from the cheaters (net of foregone nes from non-caught cheaters). The costs are in
e¤orts on auditing two types of reports. With independent incomes, the expression
takes the form of
R
2
=  (1 + qs) t   (q + 1  ) (k + a)
note that this is the same as in the representative case, only the values for p; q; a are
di¤erent.
Using the indi¤erence conditions we can conveniently write income from honest
behavior
I =


q ( (1  t)  c) +

1  

q

( (1  t))
which is simplied to
I =  (1  t)  

qc
So, the expected income of the high income taxpayers is negatively related to the
equilibrium cheating level and both exogenous and endogenous coordination costs.
D - derivation of the comparative statics results
Miscoordination costs and correlation coe¢ cient
q22c+ q (k   st   c) + k (1  ) = 0
2
 
q2dc+ 2qcdq

+ dq (k   st   c)  qdc = 0
dq ((4q   1) c+  (k   st)) = q (1  2q) dc
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Let us consider few cases. First, if q > 1
2
: rhs is negative; lhs is also negative. Thus,
dq
dc
> 0. This makes sense. If q < 1
2
, rhs is positive and lhs is negative. thus, dq
dc
< 0.
This is a very nice result with simple intuition: when there are more than half of
cheaters, the greater coordination costs increase equilibrium evasion, and visa versa.
The same is true for the correlation coe¢ cient, that gives us the following expres-
sion
dq (4cq + k   st   c) = cq (1  2q) d
If under given parameters there are less than half cheating people, equilibrium evasion
decreases in correlation increase. This is less intuitive, but note that the higher
correlation acts exactly in the same way as the miscoordination costs. Actually, it is
exactly part of miscoordination costs, which is endogenous in our model - a markup
on auditing probability faced by miscoordinated reports.
Actually, we can show how the markup is increasing with correlation:
p (HL)  p (LL) = 1  k q +    
q (1 + s) t
  1 + kq
2 + 2q (   ) + 1  2 + 
(q2 + q (   )) (1 + s) t
which can be rearranged to
k
q (1 + s) t
 
1  4 (1  q)  2

 (q   1) + 
!
From here it is visible that the markup is increasing with .
Second order costs
d2q
dc2
=   q
2 (1  2q) (4q   1)
((4q   1) c+  (k   st))2
arg sign = q2 (1  2q) (1  4q)
So, the cheating is convex in costs for intervals
 
0; 1
4

and
 
1
2
; 1

of the range; it is
concave on the rest of the interval.
Cross e¤ect
Another interesting thing is to see dq
dc
(r) = 0 :we do it in a separate le without
apparent success.
dq (4cq + k   st   c) = qc (1  2q) d
dq
d
=
qc (1  2q)
((4q   1) c+  (k   st))
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di¤erentiate (and dene S := st   k)
d2q
ddc
=
 
(1  4q) dq
dc
c+ q (1  2q) ((4q   1) c+  (k   st))  qc (1  2q)   4dq
dc
c+ 4q   1
((4q   1) c+  (k   st))2 
(1  4q) dq
dc
c+ q (1  2q) ((4q   1) c  S)  qc (1  2q)   4dq
dc
c+ 4q   1
((4q   1) c  S)2
c = 0 :
q (1  2q) ( S)
( S)2 =
 q (1  2q)
S
so, the initial cross e¤ect is negative for the decreasing part of the function (q < 1
2
);
it is positive for the increasing part of the funcion. Thus, costs of di¤erent types
reinforce each other at low exogenous costs, which is not counterintuitive, as there
is no congestione¤ect, but only complementarity of costs. If cheating is popular
(q > 1
2
), increasing of one type of the costs has the stronger cheating-boosting e¤ect
on equilibrium, the larger is the costs of the other type.
Fine
The ne is obviously expected to have a deterring e¤ect on the evasion. Indeed, we
see that
4cqdq + dq (k   c)  t (sdq + qds) = 0
((4q   1) c  S) dq = qds
More interestingly, the deterrence e¤ect is unambiguously decreasing with the cheat-
ing popularity
dq
ds
0
q
=
(4q   1) c  S   4qc
((4q   1) c  S)2 =
 c  S
((4q   1) c  S)2
Thus, initial state matters a lot in our game: it does not only determine the e¤ect of
the miscoordination costs on the cheating, but also the extent to which ne can be
e¤ective in deterring evasion. The e¤ect of the costs on the deterrence e¤ectiveness
is also of interest:
d2q
dsdc
=
q0c ((4q   1) c  S)  q (4q0cc+ (4q   1) )
((4q   1) c  S)2
 q0c (c+ S)  q (4q   1)
((4q   1) c  S)2
The denominator is obviously positive. The rst term in the nominator is positive
for q < 1
2
and negative in complementary case; the second term is positive for q < 1
4
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and negative in complementary case. So, for high cheating the costs increase the
e¤ectiveness of nes. For low cheating the opposite is true, whereas for 1
4
< q < 1
2
the e¤ect is ambiguous. Well, at least we see that surprisingly enough, the costs are
incremental for the fee e¤ectiveness when cheating is popular.
Finally, we can see how the e¤ectiveness of the ne changes with its own amount:
d2q
ds2
=
q0s ((4q   1) c  S)  q (4q0sc  t)
((4q   1) c  S)2
 q0s (c+ S) + qt
((4q   1) c  S)2
Again, with small cheating the rst term is positive; it becomes negative in the
opposite case. The second term is always positive, increasing in the evasion share. If
the following condition is true, we then have cheating being convex in the ne (thus,
every increase is less and less e¤ective):
j(4q   1) c  Sj < 1
this condition is though not guaranteed by anything, so we do not have pure convexity
result.
Auditing costs
We expect auditing costs to unambiguously favor evasion. Di¤erentiating, we get
dq ((1  4q) c+ S) = dk (1   + q)
which is positive indeed. The interesting thing is to see how our costs inuence the
auditing costs e¤ect on cheating:
d2q
dkdc
=
q0c ((1  4q) c+ S)  (1   + q)  ( 4q0cc+ 1  4q)
((1  4q) c+ S)2
does not look very intuitive. The other way is to di¤erentiate the coordination costs
e¤ect:
dq
dc
=
q (1  2q)
(4q   1) c+  (k   st)
d2q
dcdk
=
q0k (1  4q) ((4q   1) c+  (k   st))  q (1  2q) (4q0kc+ )
((4q   1) c+  (k   st))2
also not very nice. Still, the rst term is negative whenever q < 1
4
and positive
otherwise. The second term is also negative whenever q < 1
2
. The derivative is then
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unambiguosly negative for q < 1
4
; and unambiguously positive for q > 1
2
. On the rest
of the unit interval the parameter combinations determine the sign. But the general
tendency is clear: the two types of costs are reinforcing each other, just like in the
other case. To this instance, we would also like to look at the interaction of the source
of endogenous costs (correlation) with auditing costs. We are likely to get the same
since the expressions are so similar. We shall get the following kind of matrix for our
interactions:
c  k
c +
 + +
k + + +
As for the ne, the cross derivative is
d2q
dkds
=
q0s ((1  4q) c+ S) + (1   + q) (4q0sc + t)
((1  4q) c+ S)2
which i am also not really happy about. But the rst term seems to be negative,
whereas the second is ambiguous. The whole thing is negative, if
q + (1   + q) (4q0sc + t) < 0
the question is how important it is at all.
Share of high income taxpayers
Di¤erentiating the initial condition wrt gamma we get
(4qc+ k   st   c) dq + ((q   1) k   qst) d = 0
dq
d
=
qS + k
(4q   1) c  S
Obviously, this is positive for small enough  and large enough q, namely (4q   1) c >
S. For small q < 1
4
this is denitely negative, so for prevalent honesty increasing
share of high incomes brings about even more honesty. For large cheating the same
e¤ect is more likely to result even in more cheating.
Income di¤erential and tax rate
Income di¤erential in our setup is represented by parameter  as low income level
is normalized to zero. As the tax rate t, the income di¤erential does not enter our
equations separately from the surcharge rate, so their e¤ect has the same sign as the
ne s.
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Auditing probability
We know that the mixed equilibrium auditing probability is increasing in the share
of cheaters when reports are the same, and increasing for some parameter values ()
when the reports are di¤erent. This result can be used in the comparative statics
derivation for the auditing probabilities. First, consider the auditing probability p of
auditing LL report:
p = 1  k
(1 + s) t

1  
q
+ 1

Coordination costs enter this expression only through q, so we have the result mir-
roring the previuos one: when the cheating is not popular, the coordination costs
decrease the auditing probability p. Deterrence variables (surcharge rate, tax rate
and income di¤erential) act in the opposite direction through their direct (increasing
auditing) and indirect (decreasing cheating) channels. Namely,
 dp
ds
=   k
(1 + s)2 t

1  
q
+ 1

  k
(1 + s) t
1  
q2 dq
ds

dp
ds
=
k
(1 + s) t
 
1
1 + s

1  
q
+ 1

+
1  
q2 dq
ds

!
Thus, stricter enforcement actually raises zeal of tax inspectors whenever
1
1 + s

1  
q
+ 1

>  1  
q2 dq
ds

1 +
q
1   >  
1 + s
q dq
ds
which is more likely to hold when cheating is popular. A similar story happens with
the auditing costs k: they increase evasion, but also increase auditing directly. In
sum,
 dp
dk
=
1
(1 + s) t

1  
q
+ 1

  k
(1 + s) t
1  
q2 dq
dk

And the auditing is more intensive with its own costs if
1   + q < k1  
q dq
dk
here we go one step further and plug in the actual expression for the derivative to get
(1   + q)2 < k1  
q
((1  4q) c+ S)
which is a reasonable expression, hehe.
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The last thing to worry about is , but since we did not get any clear-cut result
before, we do not expect miracles here:
dp
d
=   k
(1 + s) t
 q   (1  ) (q + q)
(q)2
As q is likely to be negative, we have again direct and indirect e¤ects working in
opposite directions. When the direct e¤ect overweighs, the total derivative is positive,
so that with increaing share of high income taxpayers the auditing probability is
increasing.
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